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Despite the European Union’s (EU) history of development for more than
five decades; the EU is now suffering from a backlash and crises. The
prevalence of aggressive tax avoidance scenarios conducted by
multinationals is one of the most heated issues. This paper will explain the
paradox in the development of EU law regarding direct taxation, and
points out the challenges and opportunities available in the development of
this specific sector of EU legislation. The reflections generated from
studying the EU might be useful for other regional integration projects,
such as NAFTA, ASEAN or Union of South American Nations (USAN).
To this day, EU law does not achieve much regarding direct taxation. This
lack of direction presents itself as a first-level paradox: EU harmonization
law aims to reduce taxpayers’ compliance costs and improve the EU’s
internal market; in reality, EU harmonization law is fragmented and full of
political compromises. The proposed tax reforms from the EU all look
promising, but real progress is rare due to EU legislation proposals,
regarding direct taxation, having to be passed unanimously. From the mid-
1980 until 2018, there have only been a handful of Directives on the
subject of direct taxation in EU law that have passed. Furthermore,
Member States are still eagerly competing with each other to make
themselves attractive to foreign investors. This drive to remain competitive
is the second-level paradox: on the one hand, EU Member States have their
solidarity commitment to maintain the EU internal market as a borderless
free market; on the other hand, EU Member States are eager to maintain
their diversity and to compete.
The paradox within the  EU harmonization laws on taxation seems
inevitable. The EU does not have powers to levy tax from individuals or
companies. The harmonization of EU legislation on taxation merely
provides a framework, leaving an element of discretion to EU Member
States regarding its implementation. Such harmonization is largely based
on national tax laws or experiences from international tax treaties.
However, due to the sensitive nature of the direct taxation as fiscal
autonomy, EU law has never extensively harmonized corporate tax. Even
though national corporate tax laws have become barriers for cross-border
economic activities, due to disparities and mismatches between national
tax laws which would create high compliance burdens for cross-border
economic operators, Member States are still quite cautious to take on
reformed tax proposals.
Besides, although there are some cooperation mechanisms between tax
authorities, there is no “one-stop shop” mechanism for companies to file
their tax returns across the EU. Other tax reform proposals, such as
Financial Transaction Tax or Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
(CCCTB), have been long pending. There have also been some failed and
withdrawn proposals, such as cross-border intra-group loss offsetting. In
comparison to the slow pace of most tax reform proposals, the Anti-Tax
Avoidance Directive (ATAD), consisting of several typical anti tax-
avoidance rules, was unanimously and quickly accepted by all EU Member
States. This was due to the directives direct reflection of the current trend
in the field of international tax- combating profit shifting and base erosion
(BEPS), seen especially  through tax avoidance scenarios conducted by
multinational enterprises.
Some argue that it is more practical to allow EU Member States to “exit
from some EU tax law regimes” after an attempt at implementation of the
aforementioned regime, in order to encourage EU Member States to make
some progress in the field of corporate tax. Such an approach looks
practical, however,  does not fully address the question of balancing both
harmonization and diversity. In my opinion, to address such a paradox and
to break the current deadlock, it would be necessary to build a multi-
dimensional normative framework. This framework would not be built
around a business friendly perspective, with the aim of constructing an
internal market, but would also incorporate   elements of fairness and
redistribution into the overall perspective. Merely pursuing efficiency
wouldn’t be sufficient in regard to addressing the complexity of the
corporate taxation. When it comes to the justification of taxation at the
national level, the the creation of overall benefits provides a convincing
argument- when a state provides true benefits to the citizens, levying tax is
justified. In my view, the benefit principle should also apply to the EU
context regarding allocating taxing powers between Member States.
Besides, to develop a successful proposal with the field of corporate tax
law, it would be more convincing to apply the perspective of the
subsidiarity principle, according to which the EU has to demonstrate the
added value and the proportionality of any new legislation proposed.
EU harmonization should never mean eliminating diversities, though
harmonization does reduce unnecessary disparities. The subsidiarity
principle is not only used to challenge the legitimacy of EU law, but also as
a basis of efficiency. In fact, over-harmonization would not achieve
economic efficiency either,since every Member State has its own distinctive
resources and society features and thus should have the freedom to decide
the level of public benefits and how to levy tax to provide these public
benefits. With such freedom, EU Member States can conduct fair
competition to provide the most efficient service to attract individuals and
businesses. Therefore, combining the benefit principle and the subsidiarity
principle seems to be a new opportunity for addressing the paradox in the
development of  EU tax laws.
“Unity in diversity” is the essence and origin of EU integration. This motto
might sound naive, but it could be the solution to the current issues
confronted by the EU. When the EU can convince citizens that a specific
measure by the EU brings true benefits to the public, such measures can be
accepted in a quick and easier manne rr  Re-distribution and combating
tax avoidance should be understood as a type of public benefit, with the
example of the the Anti Tax-avoidance directive providing a persuasive
framework for why the people should be supporting the EU in her fight
against tax avoidance. A new normative framework for all EU tax reform
proposals would be the best opportunity to successfully tackle tax
avoidance, through combining the benefit principle and the subsidiarity
principle, and thus bringing back the ultimate and fundamental belief in
EU integration. This new framework would allow for the pursuit  of
economic integration whilst fostering the diversity across Member States
to compete, consequently achieving a structure true efficiency, as well as
fairness between individuals.
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